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Introduction
The topic of informal patient payments is rather new 
in research and policy discussions although the phenom-
enon has existed for decades [1]. Studies on informal 
patient payments published hitherto refer mainly to the 
period after 1990 and mainly to former-socialist countries 
[2]. Therefore, Thompson and Witter [3] argue that infor-
mal patient payments are one of the phenomena, which 
the transition economies inherited from the communist 
period. Nevertheless, unofficial payments for health care 
services are reported in other countries as well. This in-
cludes low- and middle-income countries, for example 
Uganda, Peru and Turkey [4–6], and high-income coun-
tries like Greece [7], which are not former-socialist coun-
tries. Certain unofficial payments for health care services 
(even though not widely spread) are reported in some 
other high-income countries in Europe, such as Italy and 
Austria [8]. Apparently, the presence of informal patient 
payments is an important feature of many health care sys-
tems around the world [9]. 
Empirical studies indicate that informal payments are 
made to both medical staff in hospitals and general prac-
titioners in policlinics (e.g. [3, 10–17]). Informal patient 
payments are most often reported for services included 
in the basic health care package, but services outside the 
basic package are also affected. These payments are ob-
served in all patient groups irrespective of the socio-eco-
nomic status of the patients. However, empirical studies in 
some countries report certain variations among the patient 
groups. For example, elderly and those with low-level of 
education are found to pay less informally than the young-
er and those with high-level of education [7, 17]. 
The measurement of informal patient payments is 
a challenging task since these payments are a multi-face 
phenomenon with different features even within a single 
country, i.e. in the frame of the same health care system, 
regulations and traditions [2]. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence indicates that informal patient payments can 
represent a significant part of the income of the health 
care providers. In some instances, physicians may earn as 
much as a full additional salary from informal payments 
[9, 18]. In more extreme cases (i.e. specialised doctors 
in Albania), physicians may increase their incomes up to 
five times through such informal payments [19].
These payments can also represent a significant part 
of the total health care expenditure. According to Lewis 
[15], informal health care expenditure represents about 
84% of the total national health expenditures in Azerbai-
jan and 56% in the Russian Federation. More recent stud-
ies suggest that informal health care expenditure consti-
tutes about 1.5–4.6% of the total health expenditure in 
Hungary, about 3.6% in Bulgaria and about 0.3–0.5% 
in Poland [9, 17, 18]. Although the level and incidence 
of informal payments are difficult to compare across 
countries, these payments are substantial in terms of both 
scope and scale, and should not be neglected. 
This paper outlines the negative effects of informal 
payments for public health care provision and the rea-
sons for their existence. Based on this, the paper dis-
cusses a mixture of strategies as a plausible solution to 
informal patient payments. The focus is on policy mech-
anisms that can help to deal with this type of payment 
in a country. 
1. Why do informal patient payments matter?
Informal patient payments affect the health care pro-
vision in a very complex and interrelated manner. On the 
one hand, these payments usually exist in a context of 
limited resources for health care provision and therefore, 
informal compensations to providers appear to be a fea-
sible solution for receiving treatment. On the other hand, 
these payments are a threat to public health since those 
who cannot afford to pay informally might forgo or delay 
seeking treatment [7, 20, 21, 26]. Thus, informal patient 
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payments can jeopardise efficiency, equity, and quality of 
health care provision. 
In case of informal patient payments, the providers 
of health care services are compensated individually, ir-
respective of the value of health care provision to the so-
ciety. Thus, the role of health policy and priorities set by 
policy-makers are undermined by the existence of these 
payments. The informal cash-flow goes directly from the 
patients to medical staff in publicly funded health care fa-
cilities and remains unregistered. In view of this, informal 
patient payments can become a major impediment to on-
going reforms because they hinder the estimation of future 
funding requirements of the health care sector [12, 15].
The existence of informal patient payments can 
also obstruct the attempts to improve the technical ef-
ficiency of health care provision [13, 15]. In fact, these 
payments might introduce incentives for providing less 
cost-effective services if patients are willing or accept to 
pay informally. It is likely that the practice of informal 
patient payments can lead to resource allocation that is 
different from the social optimum. Specifically, in case 
of informal patient payments, resources are not allocated 
based on the benefits to the society and services are not 
consumed by those who would benefit most, but rather 
by those who are able to pay or are easily forced into 
paying [3, 7, 12, 22]. Thus, social efficiency is adversely 
affected as well. 
Significant quality improvements, as a result of infor-
mal patient payments seldomly exist. Overall, health care 
providers are not interested in reinvesting these payments 
in the public health care system (e.g. for purchasing new 
medical equipment) but are more likely to invest them in 
their own private practices (if dual-practice is allowed and 
if informal payments are invested at all). In the long run, 
this leads to better quality of services provided in the pri-
vate sector, even when provided by the same physician. 
Thus, the public health care provision remains under-
funded even when informal patient payments are widely 
spread. This does not mean however, that the health care 
providers remain under-paid. Yet, there are no incentives 
for health care providers to improve current conditions 
and working patterns when they provide public health 
care services and receive informal payments [15]. 
The most adverse effect of informal patient payments 
concerns equity. When informal patient payments are 
established as a practice, patients who cannot afford to 
pay informally either avoid or delay seeking treatment, 
or more likely, use personal savings, loans and sell as-
sets to cover these payments [26]. The ultimate effect is 
the same as referring patients to the private health care 
sector [13]. Thus, the burden of informal patient payment 
is not distributed equally within different socio-economic 
groups. In some instances, patients with very low earnings 
are found to pay informally about six times more in rela-
tion to their income than those in high-income groups [20, 
21]. Therefore, informal patient payments are highly re-
gressive even when compared to formal patient fees [15].
Since informal patient payments are provider-deter-
mined (excluding expressions of gratitude where patients 
are intrinsically motivated to make informal payments), 
there is a hypothesis that health care providers can cross-
subsidise unofficially when charging wealthier patients 
with higher informal payments than the poor patients 
[13]. However, the validity of this hypothesis depends 
to a large extent on the social structure and level of soli-
darity within the society [23]. The rationale behind the 
theory of cross-subsidising is quite weak since willing-
ness-to-pay is a more important determinant of informal 
patient payments than the ability-to-pay, especially when 
immediate care is needed and where the choice of pro-
viders is limited [13]. There is no reason to expect that 
wealthier patients will pay more informally than the poor. 
In fact, the empirical evidence shows rather the opposite 
[20, 21]. 
The issue of informal patient payments is also rel-
evant to policy-making when formal patient payments 
are introduced or considered for introduction. There is an 
overall concern that official charges do not have the abil-
ity to eliminate the informal ones, and their introduction 
may result in a mixture of formal and informal payments 
by the patients [24–26]. If no effective measures for deal-
ing with informal patient payments are introduced, the 
effectiveness of the exemption mechanism for vulner-
able population groups that accompanies official charges, 
could be undermined.
2. Why do informal patient payments exist?
Before attempting to deal with informal patient pay-
ments, it is necessary to understand the reasons for their 
existence and their role in health care provision. This 
could indicate the mechanisms through which these pay-
ments can be influenced by policy, as well as relevant 
strategies for dealing with these payments.
The literature offers various theoretical explanations 
of informal patient payments. Namely, Gaal and McKee 
[27] develop a cognitive behavioural model on informal 
payments, which draws on the theory of government 
failure and extends Hirschman’s theory of “exit, voice, 
loyalty” (INXIT theory). The INXIT theory is applicable 
in different situations, i.e. indentifying quality-conscious 
patients and physicians, and analysing their response to 
a decline in performance, as well as to key dilemmas in 
the health care systems seeking to improve equity and 
efficiency [27]. 
Another theory that could offer a way of understand-
ing informal patient payments is the theory of Bourdieu 
[28]. This theory is constructed in response to theory 
of rational choice as an explanation of human behav-
iour. It emphasises the role of practice and embodiment 
or forms in social dynamics and worldview construc-
tions. Bourdieu [28] uses the concepts “field” and “ha-
bitus”, where “field” is a social arena in which people 
manoeuvre and struggle in pursuing desirable resources 
and where “habitus” is a system of dispositions toward 
various practices. 
Theories from the field of sociology and psychol-
ogy (such as theory of rational choice, theory of social 
exchange, psychology of change, theories of reasoned 
action and planned behaviour) also appear relevant for 
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explaining the phenomenon of informal patient pay-
ments. For example, Vian and Burak [29] analyse the 
existence of informal payments from the perspective of 
intentions, past behaviours, attitudes and beliefs. 
Empirical evidence confirms these theoretical expla-
nations. It indicates that informal patient payments are 
sometimes made due to the patients’ gratitude for servic-
es provided [10, 12], but such payments also result from 
the misuse of market power by the health care providers 
due to monopoly or due to the principle-agent relation 
between providers and patients [7, 13, 25]. 
As reported in empirical studies (e.g. [3, 7, 10, 12, 15, 
30–32]), the main reasons why patients make informal 
payments and why physicians or medical staff accept/
request such payments, can be summarised as follows:
Patients make informal payments in order to:
–  thank the physician and medical staff;
–  reduce waiting time from referral to hospitalisation;
–  obtain services with higher quality or obtain more 
services;
–  obtain treatment at specific health care facilities or 
from specific physicians;
–  obtain services that are not available formally in the 
medical institution; 
–  substitute for a high formal patient payment; 
–  respond to the request of physician or medical staff to 
pay informally; 
–  establish a good relationship with the physician (in 
order to get good service next time or to get the servi-
ce at any time).
Physicians or medical staff accept/request such pay-
ments due to: 
–  low level of income and salaries;
–  possibility to receive unregistered cash that is several 
times higher than formal fees;
–  incoherence between official fees and physicians’ per-
ception of their true costs;
–  perceived higher expertise than colleagues, who rece-
ive the same reimbursement;
–  lack of resources for purcha sing necessary equipment, 
instruments, and materials;
–  lack of resources for professional development and 
improvement;
–  lack of regulations and unresponsive government.
Thus, informal patient payments can be seen either as 
“donation” or as “fee-for-service” [9]. The donation hy-
pothesis affirms that gratitude payments do not adversely 
affect efficiency in health care provision in cases when the 
gratitude payments are sustainable [26]. Gratitude payments 
can improve the responsiveness of health care staff, ensure 
sustainable supply of human resources, and provide incen-
tives for physicians to stay in the profession, especially in 
countries where medical staff is under-paid [9]. The fee-
for-service hypothesis states that informal patient payments 
can exhibit the adverse effects of formal co-payments but 
with additional complication of lack of transparency, which 
makes it difficult to control them [3, 10, 15, 27]. Still, these 
are only hypotheses and they need to be tested to explain the 
existence of informal patient payments in some parts of the 
world and their absence in others.
3. Three areas for possible solutions
Overall, the reasons for the existence of informal pa-
tient payments discussed above, suggests three areas for 
possible solutions to the problem of informal patient pay-
ments: cultural perceptions, insufficient funding of the 
health care sector and lack of control and accountability 
in the health care system. 
Cultural perceptions 
People use gifts to express their gratitude. Thus, grati-
tude payments for health care services could be seen as 
a part of the social culture (see e.g. [10, 12]). However, 
informal patient payments are gratitude payments as long 
as they are gifts in kind with negligible monetary value 
and are given after the service provision [1] by the thank-
ful patient without any request or hint by the staff. Truly 
gratitude payments would be sustainable for the patient 
and patient’s family, and would not adversely affect ef-
ficiency in health care provision. The elimination of such 
informal payments would require a change of culture, 
which means inter-sector efforts and generally more time 
to be achieved. Nevertheless, informal payments that are 
not truly gratitude payments (e.g. expensive gifts in kind 
or informal cash payments often requested by the staff 
or given by the patient as a bribe for service provision) 
may also look or may be even presented like gratitude 
payments. To be able to deal with such “gratitude” pay-
ments, strategies for dealing with corruption should be 
followed [30, 33].
Insufficient funding
In countries where the public health care sector is 
under-funded, the existence of informal patient payments 
is often excused by insufficient health care resources (see 
e.g. [3]). As a result, informal patient fees are charged 
by providers to fill in the gaps in funding of medical 
supplies, diagnostics, pharmaceuticals and hospital ho-
tel services. Informal compensations are also requested 
(directly or indirectly) to supplement the low salaries of 
health care providers. Under these circumstances, infor-
mal payments become a means for the patient to receive 
more attention by the health care staff, as well as to en-
sure better quality and quicker access to health care [7, 
26, 31]. Informal compensations also provide incentives 
for low-paid physicians to stay in the profession. How-
ever, the implementation of formal patient fees with an 
adequate exception mechanism in addition to a suitable 
health care funding mechanism, would be a more appro-
priate solution to insufficient health care resources. Nev-
ertheless, Lewis [5] shows that this is not sufficient to 
eliminate informal payments. The formal fees should be 
accompanied by a suitable rewarding mechanism for the 
physicians. 
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Lack of control and accountability 
Governance and accountability in the health care sec-
tor emerge as important determinants of the performance 
of the health care systems (see e.g. [27, 33]). Neverthe-
less, they are still under-estimated and even neglected in 
some countries. Poor governance and poor accountability 
contribute to the existence of corruption and create a fa-
vourable environment for informal patient payments. The 
incapability to maintain the rule of law leads to non-ethi-
cal behaviour of medical staff, who can use their bargain-
ing power to increase their earnings [34, 35]. Thus, the 
development of a transparent system for monitoring and 
control of health care provision and patient payments can 
be essential steps in dealing with informal payments. 
4. Strategies for dealing with informal patient payments
There is no single solution since the phenomenon 
of informal patient payments is not isolated but rather 
connected to the overall performance of public health 
care sector in a country (e.g. [3, 13]). Moreover, differ-
ent strategies for dealing with informal patient payments 
have various disadvantages [3, 13].
Punitive measures
Penalties can be imposed on those who receive/re-
quest informal payments. One of the basic characteristics 
of the environment where informal payments are preva-
lent is a weak regulatory system. Strengthening the con-
trol and accountability in the health care sector will be 
essential for dealing with corruption. However, if the fi-
nancing of the health care system is insufficient, it is hard 
to expect that imposing sanctions to providers would be 
an effective measure for dealing with informal patient 
payments. Among other things, imposing sanctions could 
be one of the driving forces for shifting providers from 
public to private sector. The government should continue 
to invest in the improvement of health care quality and 
access to health care services.
Higher salaries for health care workers
The income of physicians and medical staff could be 
increased. Informal patient payments often supplement 
the low salaries of physicians and medical staff in the 
public sector. However, the simultaneous increase in the 
income level of physicians and medical staff is a rather 
challenging task since it depends on the overall economic 
growth in the country. An alternative is to implement 
a provider payment mechanism that will allow for a more 
fair compensation for service provision (e.g. based on 
quality and professional skills) rather than a uniform cen-
tral payment scale for physicians and medical staff. This, 
however, should be combined with a significant increase 
in the incomes of providers who offer good services, 
to assure the acceptance of this new provider payment 
mechanism by the medical lobby. 
Introduction of formal patient charges 
It is assumed that patients who pay informally would 
be in favour of introducing official charges for public 
health care services. Yet, there is an overall concern that 
official charges do not have the ability to eliminate the 
informal ones, and that their introduction would result 
in a mixture of formal and informal payments by the 
patients. Moreover, vulnerable population groups who 
are exempted from formal charges might continue to pay 
informally, especially if the medical staff refuses to grant 
the formal exemption and requests an informal payment. 
This could result in a failure of the exemption mechanism 
that accompanies the official charges and could create 
public opposition towards these changes. It is necessary 
to assure that formal charges replace informal payments 
immediately after their introduction. 
Development of private sector alternatives 
The effect of informal patient payments is similar to 
shifting the patients to the private sector. Therefore, the 
development of the private sector could help to formalise 
the informal payments. In particular, patients could be 
offered the option to use health care services included 
in the basic health care package but provided by private 
health care providers. This could result in a direct com-
petition for patients and some physicians might decide to 
be involved in both sectors. Lower or no official charges 
in the public sector compared to the private sector might 
stimulate the use of public health care services. However, 
better quality of services provided in the private sector, 
even when provided by the same physician (if dual-
practice exists), might shift patients to the private sector. 
Given the potential weaknesses of each of the above op-
tions, a mixture of strategies is advisable for dealing with 
the problem of informal patient payments. The successful 
implementation of these strategies and the possibility to 
circumvent their weaknesses will depend on the particu-
lar setting and the overall conditions in the country [3, 
13]. The prevalence of corruption in the society is crucial. 
Dealing with corruption at all social levels will be a pre-
condition for dealing with informal patient payments. 
5. Changes in attitudes as a precondition for success
Changes in attitudes of the health care consumers, 
providers and policy-makers will also play a crucial role 
in eliminating informal payments for health care serv-
ices. This could help to build a social resistance against 
this type of payments. 
Health care consumers
While consumers are generally interested in solving 
the problem of informal patient payments, they often 
accept these payments as a means of gaining more at-
tention, better quality and quicker access to health care. 
Information campaigns among health care consumers 
are needed to change their attitude towards informal 
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payments [10, 29]. In addition to this, patients need to 
be well informed about the size of the official fees that 
they are obliged to pay for health care service prior to the 
use of these services. Patients are often unable to make 
a distinction between formal and informal payments, es-
pecially if they do not know the exact size of the formal 
charge. Also, there is a need of a formalised channel for 
filing complaints by patients who are asked to pay infor-
mally for health care services. The procedure for filing 
such complaints should be easy and simple.
Health care providers 
Health professionals are often reluctant to comply 
with strategies for dealing with informal patient pay-
ments and attempt to maintain the “status quo”. They 
might even try to sabotage measures aimed at eliminating 
informal payments (e.g. by creating unnecessary delays 
for patients). Therefore, the power of the medical lobby 
will play a key role in eliminating informal payments [3, 
13]. Mechanisms to improve integrity and ethics in health 
care provision will be essential. It is necessary to develop 
a professional code of conduct for physicians and other 
health professionals related to medical and non-medical 
activities. The main objective of such codes should be to 
ban the request or acceptance of any informal payment 
(either in cash or in kind), including gratitude payments 
and gifts.
Health policy-makers 
Informal patient payments are not always seen as 
a negative phenomenon by policy-makers, especially 
in countries with very low fiscal capacities and insuffi-
cient financing of the public health care sector [15, 26]. 
In these countries, informal patient payments could be 
the only factor that maintains the survival of the public 
health care system and keeps physicians working in pub-
lic health care institutions (e.g. hospitals). Thus, policy-
makers might address informal patient payments since 
they are of an unethical nature, but they might decide to 
neglect these payments in their decisions since they do 
not have an alternative for filling in the gaps in the public 
health care budgets. Due to the non-transparent nature of 
the informal patient payments, health authorities might 
even deny the existence of bribes in the health care sys-
tem [3]. Under such circumstances, solutions to the prob-
lem of informal patient payments would not be a priority. 
Changes in the attitude of policy-makers toward informal 
patient payments will be essential.
Conclusion and policy recommendations
This paper reviewed the policy challenges related to 
informal payments for public health care provision and 
strategies for dealing with these payments. Although we 
recognise that the exact measure for eliminating informal 
patient payments depends on the country context (e.g. 
prevalence of corruption, and attitudes of health system 
stakeholders towards informal payments), we outline 
several policy recommendations that might be useful for 
policy-makers confronted with this health care problem. 
In particular, we suggest that policy-makers should 
strengthen the control and accountability in their health 
care sectors and create a system of penalties for those 
who receive/request informal payments. A simple and 
easily accessible system for filing complaints by patients, 
who are asked to pay informally for health care services, 
should be in place. At the same time, it will be neces-
sary to assure continuous government investments in the 
improvement of health care quality and access to health 
care services, as well as an adequate system funding for 
the normal functioning of the public health care sector. 
The implementation of a provider payment mecha-
nism that allows for an adequate and fairer compensation 
for service provision (depending on quality and profes-
sional skills) could also facilitate the elimination of in-
formal patient payments. There should be also incentives 
for the development of a private sector that leads to direct 
competition between public and private providers, but the 
dual-practice by physicians should be prohibited.
These mechanisms for dealing with informal patient 
payments could be coupled with the introduction of of-
ficial/formal patient charges with an adequate exemption 
and fee reduction mechanism for those who cannot pay 
or who use health care frequently. It is also necessary to 
identify instruments to assure that formal charges replace 
informal payments immediately after their introduction 
to avoid the double financial burden to patients, as well 
as the failures of the exemption mechanism. Moreover, 
a transparent system of official patient charges should be 
created. Information about official charges and free-of-
charge services should be available and easily accessible 
to patients prior to service use. 
Information campaigns targeting health care consum-
ers, providers and policy-makers should be launched in 
order to mobilise a social opposition against informal 
patient payments. This will be an important precondition 
for the successful elimination of these payments.
Acknowledgement:
The study is financed by the European Commission under the 7th Frame-
work Programme, Theme 8 Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities, 
Project ASSPRO CEE 2007 (Grant Agreement no. 217431). The views 
expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission 
or its services.
Abstract:
The topic of informal patient payments is rather new in policy discus-
sions although the phenomenon has existed for decades. These pay-
ments are a threat to public health since they jeopardise efficiency, eq-
uity and quality of health care provision. Most importantly, those who 
cannot afford to pay might not seek or delay seeking treatment. Before 
attempting to deal with informal patient payments, it is necessary to un-
derstand the reasons for their existence and their role in health care pro-
vision. This could indicate the mechanisms through which these pay-
ments can be influenced by policy, as well as relevant strategies for 
dealing with these payments. This paper outlines a mixture of strategies 
as a plausible solution to informal patient payments. The successful im-
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plementation of these strategies depends on the particular setting and 
the overall conditions in the country (e.g. prevalence of corruption, and 
attitudes of health system stakeholders towards informal payments).
Streszczenie:
Nieformalne opłaty pacjentów za świadczenia opieki 
zdrowotnej: wyzwania dla polityki i strategie rozwiązań
Słowa kluczowe: opłaty nieformalne, opieka zdrowotna, strategie 
polityki zdrowotnej
Nieformalne opłaty pacjentów, choć występują od wielu dekad, są te-
matem stosunkowo nowym w dyskusjach z zakresu polityki zdrowotnej. 
Opłaty te są zjawiskiem niekorzystnym, ponieważ zagrażają efektywności, 
równości i jakości opieki zdrowotnej. Co najistotniejsze, osoby które nie 
stać na poniesienie opłaty, mogą zaniechać korzystania z opieki zdrowot-
nej lub wizytę u lekarza opóźnić. Przed podjęciem prób zwalczania opłat 
nieformalnych istotne jest zrozumienie powodów ich istnienia i roli, jaką 
pełnią w dostarczaniu świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej. Pozwoli to na wska-
zanie mechanizmów, poprzez które polityka zdrowotna będzie oddziały-
wała na opłaty nieformalne, a także istotnych strategii ich zwalczania. 
W artykule przedstawione zostały różnorodne strategie oraz prawdopo-
dobne rozwiązania problemu opłat nieformalnych. Skuteczne zastoso-
wanie tych strategii zależy od uwarunkowań danego systemu, a także 
ogólnych warunków istniejących w kraju (np. powszechności zjawiska 
korupcji i stosunku uczestników systemu opieki zdrowotnej do opłat 
nieformalnych).
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